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THE CUSTOM-TO-FAILURE CYCLE
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ† & LUCY CHANG††
ABSTRACT
In areas of complexity, people often rely on heuristics—by which
we broadly mean simplifications of reality that allow people to make
decisions in spite of their limited ability to process information. When
this reliance becomes routine and widespread within a community, it
can develop into a custom. As long as such a heuristic-based custom
reasonably approximates reality, society continues to benefit. In the
financial sector, however, rapid changes in markets and products
have disconnected some of these customs from reality, leading to
massive failures, and increasing financial complexity is accelerating
the rate of change, threatening future failures. We examine this
“custom-to-failure cycle” and consider how law can help to manage
the cycle and to mitigate its failures. In that context, we also analyze
whether individuals and firms who follow heuristic-based customs
should be subject to liability if the resulting failures harm society.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Human beings are “limited-capacity information processors.” In
areas of complexity, we tend to compensate by relying heavily on
heuristics—broadly defined as simplifications of reality that allow us
to make decisions in spite of our limited ability to process
2
3
information. Sometimes these simplifications are based on models.
4
Other simplifications are more psychologically based.

1. Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Towards a
Social Contingency Model, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 335 (1992).
2. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 584 (11th ed. 2008) (defining a
“heuristic” as a method or procedure that “serv[es] as an aid to . . . problem-solving by
experimental and esp[ecially] trial-and-error methods”). An example of such a heuristic is the
U.S. legal requirement that purchasers of alcohol must be at least twenty-one years of age,
which reduces the complicated question of an individual’s ability to responsibly consume
alcohol to the simple metric of age. In this Essay, the term “heuristic” does not refer to
cognitive biases, such as availability and optimism bias, that are sometimes referred to as
heuristics. For further information on such biases, see generally, for example, NASSIM
NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN (2007); and Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz,
Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349,
1367–70 (2011), which discuss the cognitive constraints associated with analyzing complex
financial information. There is significant literature detailing these biases and offering
suggestions to reduce the impact of such biases in consumer decisionmaking. See generally, e.g.,
MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE (2011); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).
3. In operations research, for example, the term “heuristics” refers to “computationally
simple models that allow people to ‘ . . . quickly [find] good feasible solutions.’” Konstantinos V.
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Reliance on a heuristic can become so routine and widespread
within a community that it develops into a custom, which we refer to
5
in this Essay as a “heuristic-based custom.” This type of custom may
6
not—and indeed, as this Essay assumes, does not —become the basis
for law per se. Rather, it is a custom in the sense of a “usual or
7
habitual course of action, a long-established practice,” which is
8
merely “one element of the law-creating fact called custom.”
When a heuristic-based custom reasonably approximates reality,
society should benefit. Modern finance, for example, has become so
complex that the financial community routinely relies on heuristicbased customs, such as determining creditworthiness of securities by
relying on formalistic credit ratings and assessing risk on financial
9
products by relying on simplified mathematical models. Without this
10
reliance, financial markets could not operate.
Katsikopoulos, Psychological Heuristics for Making Inferences: Definition, Performance, and the
Emerging Theory and Practice, 8 DECISION ANALYSIS 10, 11 (2011) (alterations in original)
(quoting FREDERICK S. HILLIER & GERALD J. LIEBERMAN, INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS
RESEARCH 624 n.1 (7th ed. 2001)).
4. In psychology, the term “heuristic” refers to both informal and quantitative
psychological processes that “in general . . . are quite useful, but sometimes . . . lead to severe
and systematic errors.” Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). For a discussion of many common
psychologically based simplifications and errors, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW (2011).
5. We use the term “custom” in its common meaning of “a usage or practice common to
many or to a particular place or class.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 308.
6. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
7. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 440 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d
ed. 1967).
8. See id. (arguing that the second element needed for custom to become law-creating is
that the individuals performing the custom “must be convinced that they fulfill, by their actions
or abstentions, a duty, or that they exercise a right”); cf. Gerald J. Postema, Custom, Normative
Practice, and the Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 701, 717 (2012) (discussing customary rules as “rules of a
particular community that govern, but also emerge from, the interactions of its members”).
9. Christopher L. Culp, Merton H. Miller & Andrea M.P. Neves, Value at Risk: Uses and
Abuses, 10 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1998, at 26, 27 (1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1–3.
10. See James P. Crutchfield, The Hidden Fragility of Complex Systems—Consequences of
Change, Changing Consequences, in CULTURES OF CHANGE: SOCIAL ATOMS AND ELECTRONIC
LIVES 98, 102–03 (Gennaro Ascione et al. eds., 2009) (noting the increasing structural
complexity and fragility of modern markets, including financial markets, as part of “the world
we built”); see also Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA.
L. REV. 779, 799–803 (2011) (discussing the complexity of financial markets and the bounded
rationality of financial-community members, as well as the need for heuristics to process and
analyze financial information); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Complexity in
Financial Markets 5–8 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://scholar.princeton.edu/markus/files/complexity.pdf (noting that because financial-
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When a heuristic-based custom no longer reflects reality,
however, reliance on the custom can become harmful. In recent years,
for example, financial markets and products have innovated so
rapidly that heuristic-based customs—and thus behavior based on
those customs—have lagged behind the changing reality. The
resulting mismatch, in turn, has led to massive financial failures, such
11
as investors relying on credit ratings that no longer are accurate and
members of the financial community assessing risk using simplified
12
models that have become misleading.
We call this cycle—(i) reliance on heuristics that reasonably
approximate reality; (ii) the development of customs based on those
heuristics; (iii) changes that disconnect those customs from reality;
and (iv) failures resulting from continued reliance on those customs—
the custom-to-failure cycle.
This Essay tests the hypothesis of the custom-to-failure cycle in
the context of financial complexity. The focus on financial complexity
is not intended to suggest that the custom-to-failure cycle arises only
in that context; the cycle may well be part of the larger problem of
13
human limitations in processing and acting on complex information.
We have not, however, systematically examined the custom-to-failure
cycle in that larger context.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, Part I shows that reliance
on heuristics can develop into heuristic-based customs. It then
explains why heuristic-based customs can discourage the
reassessment of their underlying heuristics. Thereafter, Part II shows
that failures can result when the customs no longer reflect reality.
Finally, Part III examines how law can help to manage the
custom-to-failure cycle and to mitigate its failures. This examination

community members have bounded rationality, they must simplify complex financial markets by
using, for example, models and summaries); cf. TALEB, supra note 2, at 69 (observing that
heuristics are necessary to enable action in the face of otherwise overwhelming complexity and
randomness).
11. See infra Part II.B. Although different examples in this Essay refer to reliance on
different heuristic-based customs, each particular example refers, for clarity, to only a single
heuristic-based custom. This Essay’s analysis should be valid, however, even if an example
involved reliance on multiple heuristic-based customs.
12. See infra Parts II.A & II.B. Similar failures almost certainly will continue because
increasing financial complexity is increasing the rate of change at which financial markets and
products are innovating.
13. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 821–22 (discussing broader problems resulting from human irrationality
and overreliance on heuristics).
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dilemma.
confronts an important normative, yet real-world,
Heuristic-based customs, like any other customs, can become
internalized as social norms of appropriate behavior, hereinafter,
14
“custom-derived norms.” The creation of such norms in private
groups, such as the financial community, is a “standard explanation”
15
for successful self-regulation. The dilemma is whether individuals
and firms following heuristic-based customs that have become
custom-derived norms—assuming the custom-derived norms have not
16
themselves become law —should be subject to criminal or civil
liability when their behavior causes failures that harm society. This
dilemma is at the root of the frustration as to why, after the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression, so few have been fined or
gone to jail.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND FAILURE TO REASSESS HEURISTICBASED CUSTOMS
As reliance on a heuristic spreads throughout the financial
17
community and becomes routine, it can develop into a heuristic18
based custom. Two examples of such developments are the use of
value-at-risk (VaR) models and credit ratings. The history of these
financial tools also shows, however, that if members of the financial
community expect that heuristic-based customs approximate reality,
they may fail to question the continuing accuracy of the underlying
19
heuristic.

14. A “norm” is “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and
serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 846 (11th ed. 2008) (emphasis added).
15. ANNALISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS 33 (2011).
16. This Essay assumes that the custom-derived norms in question have not themselves
actually become law. This Essay’s concept of custom lacks the second element needed for
custom to become-law creating. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
17. For example, a heuristic may spread due to the desire of the financial-community
members to reduce transaction costs.
18. We focus on this notion of a heuristic-based custom, as opposed to custom as unwritten
law among participants. See, e.g., RICHARD C. OSBORN, BUSINESS FINANCE: THE
MANAGEMENT APPROACH 177–78 (1965) (discussing the use of trade credit as a common form
of payment and noting that this “informal system is possible only because of its general
acceptance as a customary business practice”).
19. This failure to question the continuing accuracy of underlying heuristics can be viewed
as a type of complacency. Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz¸ supra note 2, at 1366–68 (examining
complacency as a cause of financial failure).
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A. Reliance on Heuristics Can Develop into Heuristic-Based Customs
Since the 1990s, financial firms increasingly have relied on VaR
20
models to evaluate and report market risk. Although many
variations of these models exist, all summarize risk evaluation as a
21
simple quantitative statistic expressed in dollar terms. Reliance on
VaR has become so routine and widespread that it is now the
financial industry’s “standard risk measure”—effectively a heuristic22
based custom based on “computationally simple models” —for
23
assessing market risk exposure.
Credit ratings are simplifying metrics for addressing information
24
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Rating agencies
25
formalistically assess borrower creditworthiness based on models,
expressing their ultimate conclusion through “an ordinal ranking of a
borrower’s, or a security’s, credit quality” relative to other borrowers
26
and securities. Credit ratings also play a “certification” role that
27
enables comparison of securities with different risk characteristics.
Due to the simplicity of credit ratings, investors routinely have relied

20. See Culp et al., supra note 9, at 27 (stating that VaR started receiving industry support
in 1993). For current examples of VaR reliance, see MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN STANLEY
REPORTS FIRST QUARTER 2012, at 3 (2012), available at http://www.morgan
stanley.com/about/ir/shareholder/1q2012.pdf?v=1; Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 75, 135, 159, available at www.goldmansachs.com/investorrelations/financials/current/10q/10q-2012-1q.pdf.
21. See Giorgio Consigli, Tail Estimation and Mean—VaR Portfolio Selection in Markets
Subject to Financial Instability, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 1355, 1356 (2002) (noting that VaR is the
standard risk-measurement tool but also that other model-based credit-risk measurements
exist).
22. Heuristics are sometimes simplifications of reality based on computational models. See
supra note 3.
23. Consigli, supra note 21; see also Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Jan. 2, 2009, at B24 (discussing how the VaR metric came into prominence because of its ability
to assess individual and firm-wide risk and because of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s requirement that firms disclose a quantitative measure of their market risk).
24. PRAGYAN DEB, MARK MANNING, GARETH MURPHY, ADRIAN PENALVER & ARON
TOTH, BANK OF ENG., WHITHER THE CREDIT RATINGS INDUSTRY? 4 (2011), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/fs_paper09.pdf; see also Donald MacKenzie,
The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1778, 1785 (2011)
(noting that the use of credit ratings enables comparison across asset classes by reference to
spreads over benchmark rates such as LIBOR, perhaps at the danger of “black box[ing]” the
complexities of some assets).
25. See supra notes 3, 22 and accompanying text.
26. DEB ET AL., supra note 24, at 4.
27. Id. at 5–6.
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on such ratings for decades to assess borrower creditworthiness. This
reliance has become widespread not only in the United States but
29
also throughout the world, effectively forming a heuristic-based
custom for assessing creditworthiness.
B. Heuristic-Based Customs Can Discourage Reassessment of Their
Underlying Heuristics
30

As previously observed, routine and widespread reliance on
VaR models has developed into a heuristic-based custom. Financial
firms now rely on VaR models not only to evaluate market risk but
also to generate bases for compensating their employees and
managers, such as adopting compensation systems that reward profit
31
generation with “low risks” as indicated by VaR statistics. Until
recently, however, neither firms using VaR models nor employees
and managers being compensated based on such models have
32
questioned the models’ underlying heuristics. Moreover, senior
managers of financial firms, who often lack the technical expertise to
themselves question the models, have not attempted to resolve the
conflicts of interest that make reliance on the models even more
33
questionable.
Similarly, the heuristic-based custom of relying on credit ratings
had become so entrenched that, at least until the global financial
crisis, financial firms rarely questioned the accuracy of these ratings.
Faith in the accuracy of credit ratings was reinforced by their long
record of reliability for assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers
34
under relatively simple debt instruments, such as corporate bonds
35
and basic securitization instruments.

28. See Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 3 (“Investors in domestic and cross-border financial
transactions increasingly rely on rating agencies for substantial comfort regarding the risks
associated with the full and timely payment of debt securities.”).
29. Id.; see also PIERO CINQUEGRANA, THE REFORM OF THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (2009) (noting the widespread use of credit ratings).
30. See supra Part II.A.
31. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of SecondaryManagement Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460 (2009) (citing Nocera, supra note 23, at
24, 26, 46).
32. See id. at 463 (“[M]anagers will probably have little expertise to go beyond VaR or
other mathematically modeled risk profiles.”).
33. Id.; see also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., SEC Hearing on Credit Rating Agencies November 21, 2002 (2002) (prepared
statement of the Bond Market Association), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/extra/credrate/bondmarket.htm (“Credit rating agencies play a critically important
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Members of the financial community continued their
unquestioning belief in the accuracy of credit ratings even when
ratings were applied to new debt instruments, such as collateralizeddebt obligations that were themselves backed by asset-backed
36
securities (ABS CDO securities). ABS CDO securities were much
more complex and highly leveraged than corporate bonds and basic
37
securitization instruments, requiring the use of sophisticated
38
Gaussian copula analysis to analyze complex default correlations.
role . . . by providing an independent source of information on the credit standing of corporate
and other issuers of debt securities. . . . [T]he current system functions reasonably well . . . .”);
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., CORPORATE DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1920–2010, at 9
(2011),
available
at
http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?
docid=PBC_131388 (“Moody’s ratings have historically proven to be effective predictors of
default.”); STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE TO RATINGS PERFORMANCE 13 (2011), available at
http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_GuideToRatingsPerformance.pdf
(“Higher
credit ratings have typically correlated with lower default rates . . . .”); Rating the Ratings,
WORLD FIN. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.worldfinance.com/columnists/rating-the-ratings (noting
the “strong historic track record” of “global corporate ratings”).
35. See MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1784 (discussing the rating agencies’ decision to rely
primarily on existing ratings approaches to evaluate new asset-backed securities (ABS)).
36. Id. at 1784–86.
37. Rating agencies acknowledged a few differences between the rating methodology for
structured-finance securities compared to that of corporate securities but noted that the rating
process was similar for both. STANDARD & POOR’S, PRINCIPLES-BASED RATING
METHODOLOGY FOR GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE SECURITIES 5 (2007),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=12
45324618770 (explaining that Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings are the same for corporate
bonds and securitized-debt issues but noting differences in how the markets price the two
instruments); Letter from Frédéric Drevon, Senior Managing Dir. & Head of Eur., Moody’s
Investors Serv. Ltd., to Fabrice Demarigny, Sec’y Gen., Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators 2 (July
31,
2007),
available
at
http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.
aspx?docid=PBC_104185 (“The rating process in [Moody’s Investors Service’s] structured and
corporate rating groups are similar.”).
38. In the decade preceding the global financial crisis, bond investors and banks adopted a
specific statistical technique, the Gaussian copula, to evaluate the default correlation. Felix
Salmon, A Formula for Disaster, WIRED, Mar. 2009, at 74, 76–77; see also Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 657, 677–78 (2012) (discussing the origin of the Gaussian copula and its use in the
market); MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1804 (“All three main agencies largely switched to
evaluating CDOs using Gaussian-copula software systems . . . .”). Although this technique had
previously been used by actuaries to consider the impact of events on human lifespan with some
success, it had not been applied to credit-risk analysis and evaluation of ABS prior to this
period. See MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1804 (noting that S&P began using Gaussian-copula
software in November 2001 and was the first of the main agencies to employ the tool); Sam
Jones, Of Couples and Copulas, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at MAG1 (noting the use of actuarial
sciences to determine the probability of a widower’s death). Essentially, a Gaussian-copula
approach enabled a single estimate of default correlation by combining probabilities of default
of the underlying assets in a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) portfolio based on numerous
assumptions—in other words, a heuristic. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1803 n.33. Even the
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This risk-analysis methodology represented a marked change from
the traditional ratings methodologies that had proven to be reliable
39
over many decades. Nonetheless, members of the financial
community, including investors, simply assumed the continued
40
reliability of the credit ratings on the new instruments.
three major rating agencies—Moody’s Investors Service, S&P, and Fitch Ratings—adopted
some form of Gaussian-copula default correlation assessment for CDO portfolios. Id. at 1804.
The extent to which members of the financial community understood the underlying
assumptions and limitations of the Gaussian-copula approach is unclear. See Judge, supra note
38, at 723 (noting that the Gaussian copula provided “market participants and regulators [with]
a plausible basis for believing that the complexity arising from fragmentation nodes could be
managed even without being understood directly”). This discussion is not to say that rating
agencies solely relied on models in their creditworthiness evaluations of securities. See, e.g., Wall
Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 111th Cong. 48 (2010) (statement of Yuri Yoshizawa, Group Managing Director,
Structured Finance, Moody’s Investors Service) (“One common misperception is that [Moody’s]
credit ratings are derived solely from the application of a mathematical process or model. This is
not the case.”); STANDARD & POOR’S, GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 7 (2011),
available
at
http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf
(describing ratings methodologies); STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 37, at 4 (“[W]e use a
general framework and established guidelines, as well as various quantitative techniques and
models, to enhance the rating committee’s qualitative opinions.”).
39. Cf. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1784–85 (noting that the market for ABS CDO
securities would have been limited if market participation required understanding the Gaussiancopula models). Compare, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., RATING METHODOLOGY:
GLOBAL PACKAGED GOODS INDUSTRY 2 (2009), available at http://www.moodys.com/
researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_119226 (stating the five key factors used to
determine risk: (1) “Scale and Diversification,” (2) “Franchise Strength and Growth Potential,”
(3) “Distribution and Pricing Power,” (4) “Cost Efficiency and Profitability,” and (5) “Financial
Strategy and Credit Metrics”), with MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., THE BINOMIAL EXPANSION
METHOD APPLIED TO CBO/CLO ANALYSIS 1–4 (1996), available at http://www.moodys.com/
researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF5066 (describing the binomial expansion
method and providing an example of the calculations), and MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV.,
RATING METHODOLOGY: MOODY’S APPROACH TO RATING SF CDOS 1–8 (2012),
http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF157850 (using flow
charts and several equations to describe how Moody’s rates the credit risk of CDOs backed by
structured-finance assets).
40. See MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1785 (“Ratings ‘black boxed’ these complexities.”).
Rating agencies acknowledged that “[b]onds with the same credit rating, therefore, may be
comparable with respect to overall credit quality,” even if specific characteristics were not the
same. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., RATING METHODOLOGY: THE EVOLVING MEANING OF
MOODY’S BOND RATINGS 3 (1999), available at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocument
contentpage.aspx?docid=PBM_PBM48185; see also About Credit Ratings, STANDARD &
POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings (follow “Comparable Across
Different Sectors and Regions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (“Standard & Poor’s uses
the same rating scale across the structured finance, corporate, and government sectors. This
rating scale is designed to provide a common language for comparing creditworthiness,
regardless of the type of entity or assets underlying the debt instrument or the structure of the
financial obligation.”).
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II. FAILURES CAN RESULT WHEN HEURISTIC-BASED CUSTOMS NO
LONGER REFLECT REALITY
The usefulness of a heuristic depends, of course, on its
approximation of reality. In relatively stable times, when there are
considerable historical data or personal experiences upon which to
draw, heuristics—and thus heuristic-based customs—can closely
approximate reality. This Essay focuses, however, on the financial
industry, which is marked by constant change. Under these
circumstances, it is unlikely that a given heuristic will provide a close
approximation of reality for long. Periodic reevaluation of heuristicbased customs is therefore critical.
Unfortunately, as discussed in Part II, the financial community
does not always engage in that reevaluation. The result can be failure.
This Part highlights the perils of failing to reevaluate heuristic-based
customs through the examples discussed in Part II—reliance on VaR
models, and reliance on credit ratings—as well as through the
additional illustrations of reliance on collateral and incremental
innovation.
A. Failure Resulting from Reliance on VaR Models
In the decade preceding the global financial crisis, financialcommunity members placed “‘enormous faith in the market’s ability
to analyze and measure risk’ through mathematical models,” such as
41
VaR. When markets changed to embed credit-default swaps—a new
form of derivatives product—in many financial transactions, financialcommunity members continued to use VaR models to assess the risk
42
of those products.
Unfortunately, VaR modeling of credit-default swaps was
statistically distorted. Although these swaps “generate small gains but
43
only rarely have losses,” VaR models did not take into account that
credit-default swaps are likely to generate outsized losses if and when
44
such losses occur. Although some midlevel managers of firms may
have understood this distortion, conflicts of interest may have

41. Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 462 (quoting Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating
Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 211 (2009)).
42. Nocera, supra note 23, at 43.
43. Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 460.
44. See id. (“[A]ny losses that might eventually occur would be huge.”).
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dissuaded them from informing senior management. As a result,
many firms that were counterparties on credit-default swaps, or that
invested in transactions with embedded credit-default swaps, lost
46
huge amounts of money. For example, the government made
available to the American International Group (AIG) up to $182.3
billion of assistance from taxpayer funds in order to avoid insolvency
and potential systemic consequences as a result of AIG’s losses on
47
credit-default swaps.
B. Failure Resulting from Reliance on Credit Ratings
The global financial crisis also highlighted the potential for
failure resulting from reliance on credit ratings. As discussed in this
Part, members of the financial community continued to believe in the
accuracy of credit ratings even when ratings were applied to complex,
48
new, highly leveraged ABS CDO securities. Investor reliance on
credit ratings was further reinforced by financial regulators, who
sometimes incorporated credit ratings into their oversight
49
frameworks and set minimum-rating requirements on investments
50
by financial institutions.

45. See id. (explaining that midlevel, or secondary, managers of firms are normally paid on
a short-term basis, creating conflicts with the long-term interests of the firm).
46. See, e.g., John Grgurich, Credit Default Swaps: Still Here, Still Able To Wreak Havoc,
DAILYFINANCE (May 11, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/05/11/jpmorgancredit-default-swaps-still-wreaking-havoc (“Credit default swaps were at the heart of the
financial crisis.”).
47. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-574, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO AIG LESSENS AS EQUITY INVESTMENTS
ARE SOLD 15 n.62 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590677.pdf; see also id. at
17–18 (“Based on the composition of the remaining federal assistance to AIG, the repayment
and recovery progress thus far on all assistance as of March 22, 2012, and the March 30, 2012,
value of the remaining shares of AIG stock held by Treasury, the government could receive
total returns of approximately $15.1 billion in excess of the assistance provided . . . .”). For the
purposes of our analysis, the report’s suggestion that taxpayers may ultimately profit from the
bailout is irrelevant. The government did not choose to invest in AIG as a sound investment,
but rather was forced to do so to prevent the collapse of AIG. For a brief discussion of the
motivations behind and effects of these collateral calls, see RILES, supra note 15, at 3–4.
48. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
49. FIN. STABILITY BD., PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRA RATINGS 1
(2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf.
50. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1784. Professor Donald MacKenzie notes that financial
statutes and regulations may encode ratings preferences as well, id., but this is not the focus of
this Essay.
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Failure resulted when the rating methodologies utilized for ABS
51
CDO and similar securities produced inaccurate ratings. The
resulting unexpected defaults on what were thought to be investmentgrade securities triggered a loss of confidence in the accuracy of all
52
credit ratings, which in turn contributed to the financial crisis.
There are many other possible examples, two of which follow in
Sections C and D, of failures resulting from reliance on heuristic53
based customs that no longer reflect reality.
C. Failure Resulting from Reliance on Collateral
Lenders’ reliance on collateral is a rational response to the
54
asymmetric information and uncertainty inherent in making a loan.
The asymmetry and uncertainty that occur are due in part to the fact
that assessing a borrower’s ability to repay debt can be complex and
difficult because it depends not only on individual borrower
characteristics but also on macroeconomic factors, such as the
55
occurrence of a recession. Banks and other lenders therefore often
51. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 462 (“[M]any mortgage-backed securities turned out to
be incorrectly rated.”).
52. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 211, 225 (2009) (discussing financial markets’ susceptibility to contagion and how losses in
securities with “investment-grade” ratings caused investors to panic).
53. Social scientists have also observed these types of failures. Sociologist Patricia
Thornton, for example, has observed such a failure in the higher-education publishing industry
when that industry shifted from an emphasis on building author-editor relationships as a source
of long-term organic growth to adoption of the consolidated conglomerate model’s focus on
acquisitions to drive profitability and growth. PATRICIA H. THORNTON, MARKETS FROM
CULTURE: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS IN HIGHER
EDUCATION PUBLISHING 26–36 (2004). In the 1970s, higher-education publishers faced
increased resource competition and began to acquire firms and create conglomerates to achieve
economies of scale and scope to improve yearly profitability and growth. Id. at 27–28.
Eventually, reliance on making acquisitions to enhance profitability and growth became so
routine and widespread that it effectively developed into what we characterize as a heuristicbased custom. Publishing managers, whose success was now measured by yearly growth figures,
widely pursued acquisitions. Id. at 31, 34. But as the industry consolidated, the making of further
acquisitions stopped being efficient. Firm managers nonetheless continued to pursue
acquisitions, without independent cost-benefit evaluations, simply because others in the industry
were doing so. Id. Acquisitions involving higher-education publishers occurred “in
waves . . . that could not be explained by efficiency outcomes,” and many publishing
conglomerates failed. Id. at 6. We do not suggest that all of the failed acquisitions were caused
by reliance on the heuristic-based custom of pursuing acquisitions; the failure to reevaluate the
strategy of pursuing acquisitions as a simplified mode to greater profitability, however, at least
contributed to these failures.
54. See Yaron Leitner, Using Collateral To Secure Loans, BUS. REV., Second Quarter 2006,
at 9, 9 (discussing the common use of collateral to secure loans).
55. STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 38, at 11–12.

SCHWARCZ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE CUSTOM-TO-FAILURE CYCLE

12/4/2012 2:42 PM

779

rely on overcollateralization—requiring collateral with value that
exceeds the amount of the loan—as a simplified means to assess the
56
creditworthiness of their loans. Because assessing collateral value is
usually much easier than assessing a borrower’s ability to repay,
reliance on overcollateralization has become routine and widespread,
57
effectively developing into a heuristic-derived custom.
Overcollateralization can in fact provide sufficient protection
against borrower default and thus can be a reasonable proxy for
creditworthiness. Should the borrower default, the collateral can be
58
sold to repay the debt. In periods of rapid change, however, reliance
on overcollateralization can sometimes fail.
For example, in the years preceding the Great Depression, banks
lending “on margin”—a practice whereby borrowers use proceeds of
a loan to purchase shares of stock and then pledge that stock as
collateral to the banks—assumed they were adequately protected,
59
even for margin loans made to risky borrowers. Although these
loans were not initially overcollateralized—because the value of the
pledged stock initially equaled, but did not exceed, the amount of the
loan—banks expected the stock market to continue rising, as it had
for decades. An increase in stock prices, and thus a consequent
increase in the value of the collateral, would then cause the loans to
60
become overcollateralized. In October 1929, however, the collapse
in stock prices caused massive failure as many of those risky
61
borrowers defaulted on the now-undercollateralized margin loans.
Similarly, prior to the global financial crisis, banks and private
mortgage lenders made loans to risky, or “subprime,” borrowers who
used the loan proceeds to purchase homes and then mortgaged their
homes as collateral to the lenders. The lenders assumed they were

56. Heuristics include simplifications of reality based on models and psychological
processes. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. Reliance on overcollateralization is a
heuristic that overlaps these categories.
57. See generally Securities Lending: Managing Value Generation and Risk, J.P. MORGAN,
http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Securities_Lending_Managing_Value_Generation_and_
Risk/1256338170739 (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (discussing the use of collateral in securities
lending). For a discussion of the role of collateral prior to the Great Depression and leading up
to the “recent global financial crisis,” see Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1356–57, 1359–
60.
58. Financial-community members have similarly used collateral as a creditworthinessassessment tool in derivatives trading. RILES, supra note 15, at 35–36.
59. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1356.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1357.
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adequately protected. Although these mortgage loans were not
initially overcollateralized—because the value of a mortgaged home
initially equaled, but did not exceed, the amount of the loan—the
lenders expected housing prices to continue rising, as had been the
63
case for decades. An increase in housing prices, and thus a
consequent increase in the value of the collateral, would then cause
64
the loans to become overcollateralized. In the fall of 2007, however,
the collapse in housing prices caused massive failure as many
subprime borrowers defaulted on the now-undercollateralized
65
mortgage loans.
D. Failure Resulting from Incremental Innovation
Heuristic-based customs can build incrementally, with small
financial innovations building on past heuristic-based customs with
66
which financial-community members have become comfortable.

62. Id. at 1359–60.
63. Id.
64. Barry Ritholtz, Case Shiller 100 Year Chart (2011 Update), BIG PICTURE (Apr. 13,
2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/04/case-shiller-100-year-chart-2011-update.
65. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1360 (“When home prices began falling,
some of these asset-backed securities began defaulting, requiring financial institutions heavily
invested in these securities to write down their value, causing these institutions to appear, if not
be, financially risky.” (citation omitted)).
66. A somewhat analogous example of this process is the judicial misapplication of
substantive-consolidation law. Substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy in bankruptcy
whereby a bankruptcy judge can decide, in certain circumstances, to order the consolidation of
two, or more, otherwise legally separate companies. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A.
MARKELL & LISSA L. BROOME, SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL
MARKETS 85 (2004) All courts agree that substantive consolidation requires, as a minimum,
significant breaches of corporate formalities between the companies being considered for
consolidation. See id. When such breaches occur, however, courts frequently state that
substantive consolidation should be permitted only if its benefits substantially outweigh any
harm. Id. at 86. The substantially outweigh test serves as a simplifying analytical framework—a
sort of judicial heuristic. In the trivial scenario wherein the failure to substantively consolidate
companies would harm all creditors, including creditors otherwise opposing substantive
consolidation, all courts will come to the same conclusion. For all other scenarios, however,
courts purporting to apply this substantially outweigh test fail to do so in a systematic way. One
of us has testified that the confusion stems from the fact that substantive consolidation is
actually a zero-sum game: it simply rearranges how assets are distributed to creditors without
increasing the aggregate distributions. Transcript of Proceedings at 13–29, In re Petters Co., 401
B.R. 391 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009) (No. 08-45257). Accordingly, a substantially outweigh test is
mathematically nonsensical in this context. We believe that courts have not recognized this
problem for two reasons: (1) the application of substantive consolidation is inherently complex,
especially for judges who—as is unfortunately true for lawyers generally—rarely have deep
mathematical aptitude; and (2) frequent judicial repetition of the contours of the substantially
outweigh test renders that a heuristic-based custom, which impairs critical inquiry into the test.

SCHWARCZ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE CUSTOM-TO-FAILURE CYCLE

12/4/2012 2:42 PM

781

Professor Kathryn Judge notes just such an effect within the
mortgage-securitization industry in the decades preceding the global
financial crisis, by which incremental innovation resulted in incredibly
67
complex and unwieldy fragmentation of cash flows.
After banks and investors became comfortable with basic
mortgage-backed securities, they gradually became comfortable with
the addition of incremental structural innovations, riskier assets, or
both—without reconsidering that these innovations and assets
68
created new securities with new risks. As a result, these financial
institutions widely and routinely relied on assessment techniques
(heuristics) previously applied to simpler securities without properly
considering the possibility that each new innovation or asset could
render the heuristic less accurate. In fact, certain innovations and
assets reduced the heuristic’s accuracy in novel ways. For example,
although cash flows had been fragmented in the past, innovative new
69
fragmentations of cash flows misaligned investor interests. Investors,
70
however, failed to recognize the misalignment. Furthermore,
increases in the number of intermediaries between the originators of
mortgage loans and investors in the securities backed by those
mortgage loans caused an unanticipated loss of important information
71
about the loans. In addition, although investors “accustomed to
investing in private-label [mortgage-backed securities] . . . may have
questioned the additional risks posed by the inclusion of risky
mortgages in a subprime [mortgage-backed security],” those investors
67. Judge, supra note 38, at 670–77.
68. See id. at 687 (“The incremental nature of the processes through which financial
innovations become highly complex is critical to understanding . . . why that complexity itself
may not be subjected to close scrutiny by market participants or regulators.”). This increasing
comfort with incremental structural innovations is also consistent with Professor MacKenzie’s
hypothesis of path dependence, in which market participants respond to change through the
modification of existing evaluation practices, rather than the creation of new evaluation
practices. MacKenzie, supra note 24, at 1783.
69. Judge, supra note 38, at 682–83. For instance, investors in the AAA-rated tranche of a
CDO would prefer the highest-quality portfolio of assets possible, even at lower yield, whereas
investors in the unrated equity tranche of a CDO would prefer a lower-quality but higheryielding portfolio of assets to maximize their return. Note that investor interests may change
over time according to asset performance.
70. See id. at 687 (observing that an investor accustomed to cash-flow fragmentations
would not “be likely to scrutinize a gradual increase in the number or diversity of tranches
issued in MBS transactions”).
71. See id. at 686 (observing that an “investor accustomed to investing in passthroughs . . . presented with a private-label MBS, for example, may not have questioned
whether using a servicer could affect the cash flows coming from a mortgage, because the use of
such agents was an innovation to which that investor had already become accustomed”).
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“might not revisit the question of whether purchase agreements could
be relied upon to ensure mortgage originators had engaged in
appropriate due diligence in determining whether to extend a loan
72
packaged into an [mortgage-backed security].” This growing
complexity and fragmentation played a significant role in the global
73
financial crisis.
***
The discussion thus far has shown that reliance on heuristics can
develop into heuristic-based customs, that heuristic-based customs
can discourage the reassessment of their underlying heuristics, and
that failures can result when the customs no longer reflect reality. We
next examine how law can help to manage the custom-to-failure cycle
and mitigate those failures.
III. HOW LAW CAN HELP
To understand how law can help to manage the custom-to-failure
cycle and mitigate its failures, consider how law could address each
74
step in that cycle. Law could be used to try (i) to prevent reliance on
heuristics in the first place, (ii) to block the development of heuristicbased customs, (iii) to make it less likely that parties will follow
heuristic-based customs that have become disconnected from reality,
which we refer to as “outdated heuristic-based customs,” or (iv) to
address failures that result when parties follow heuristic-based
customs that no longer reflect reality.
It is unlikely that law could effectively address the first two
approaches. As to the first approach, even if law could prevent
reliance on heuristics, it would generally be unwise to do so in the
75
case of financial markets. At least in complex matters, human beings
lack the cognitive ability to make decisions without some reliance on
76
heuristics. As to the second approach, we do not see how law could

72. Id. at 686–87.
73. Id. at 687.
74. Recall that the custom-to-failure cycle is described as follows: (i) reliance on heuristics
that reasonably approximate reality, (ii) development of customs based on those heuristics, (iii)
changes that disconnect those customs from reality, and (iv) failures resulting from continued
reliance on those customs. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
75. As a positive matter, law has accomplished this outdated heuristic prevention in certain
narrow areas, such as employment discrimination. Employers may not refuse to hire or
discriminate against an individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
76. See supra Part I.
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effectively block the development of heuristic-based customs, the
development of customs being so integrally a part of human nature.
Our analysis therefore focuses on the latter two approaches.
First, we examine how law could decrease the likelihood that parties
would follow outdated heuristic-based customs. Thereafter we
examine how law could address failures that result when parties
follow outdated heuristic-based customs.
A. Making It Less Likely That Parties Will Follow Outdated
Heuristic-Based Customs
We see at least four possible ways that law could be used, in the
context of financial complexity, to make it less likely that parties will
follow outdated heuristic-based customs: (1) require financial firms to
engage in more self-aware operational risk management and
reporting, (2) limit complex financial products, (3) criminalize the
following of outdated heuristic-based customs, and (4) impose ex post
liability in an effort to internalize harm. We discuss the first three
approaches in this Part. Because the fourth approach also implicates
77
the ex post addressing of failures, we discuss it as part of Section B.
1. Requiring More Self-Aware Operational Risk Management and
Reporting. The goal of requiring more self-aware operational risk
management and reporting would be to motivate firms to reevaluate
their heuristic-based customs periodically. By analogy, the Basel III
capital-adequacy guidelines require banks to engage in periodic
78
financial “stress” scenarios, in order to motivate them to consider
the possibility of, and to better prepare for, future periods when
previously adequate liquidity and capital resources might prove
79
inadequate. Similarly, section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street

77. In this Essay, we focus on options that make parties less likely to follow outdated
heuristic-based customs, rather than on possible solutions to the underlying problems of
financial-community members. Our Essay does not, for example, address financial regulation
that could resolve core market failures such as minimizing complexity in the financial system,
mitigating intrafirm conflicts, or internalizing systemic risk consequences. For an example of
such broader analysis, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address at the European Central Bank
Seminar: A Regulatory Framework for Managing Systemic Risk (Oct. 20, 2011) (transcript
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945742).
78. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 8–9 (2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
79. CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 217 (2012); cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1389 (arguing that
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80

Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) requires
banks and other systemically important financial institutions to plan
81
for the possibility of their liquidation. A central goal of this “living
will” requirement is self-awareness, to motivate those institutions to
consider and better prepare for a time when changing circumstances
might cause their demise—no matter how unlikely that demise may
82
seem at the time the living will is being prepared.
Applying this requirement to the earlier discussion of outdated
heuristic-based customs, requiring periodic self-awareness and
reporting could have made financial-community members more
aware of the limitations of, and thus the potential for failure inherent
in, VaR models, thereby avoiding their reliance on outdated VaR
83
models. It also could have made financial-community members
more aware of the limitations of credit ratings and the potential for
failure when old ratings methodologies are applied to complex new
84
financial products. Furthermore, such a requirement for selfawareness and reporting could have made financial-community
members more aware that loans that are not initially
overcollateralized are inherently risky, given that a decline (or even a
plateau) in collateral prices can prevent those loans from ever
85
becoming overcollateralized. In each case, the requirement could
have prevented reliance on those outdated heuristic-based customs,
86
thereby preventing the failures caused by that reliance.
the simple reminder that negative economic shocks have occurred in the past will itself
encourage more critical reflection and accurate risk assessments). Ironically, reliance on stress
tests might itself create a heuristic-based custom in which the financial community fails to
engage in ongoing reevaluation of the assumptions of the stress tests. Some of those
assumptions, however, might change over time.
80. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
81. Id. § 165(d), 124 Stat. at 1426–27 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (Supp. IV 2011)).
82. See, e.g., Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012) (transcript
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spmay1012.html) (commenting
that required resolution planning “will improve [financial firms’] efficiencies, risk management
and contingency planning”).
83. See supra Part II.A. A requirement of this sort could even be coupled with a safe
harbor from liability for firms that perform frequent, ongoing operational risk assessments.
84. See supra Part II.B.
85. See supra Part II.C.
86. As a practical matter, financial-community members may choose to rely on in-house
risk managers to conduct the required reevaluation of heuristic-based customs. See, e.g., SENIOR
SUPERVISORS GRP., FIN. STABILITY BD., RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL
BANKING CRISIS OF 2008, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/

SCHWARCZ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE CUSTOM-TO-FAILURE CYCLE

12/4/2012 2:42 PM

785

2. Limiting Complex Financial Products. The second way that
law could make parties less likely to follow outdated heuristic-based
customs would be to limit complex financial products. As complexity
increases, financial-community members need to rely more heavily on
heuristic-based customs; yet the more complex something is, the less
likely it is, other things being equal, that the heuristic will accurately
87
reflect reality. Limiting complex financial products would not only
reduce the need to rely on heuristics but also would make it more
likely that the relied-upon heuristics will more accurately reflect
reality.
Absent agreement on what constitutes complexity, it would be
88
difficult to limit complex financial products per se. Complexity could
publications/r_0910a.pdf (“A key weakness in governance stemmed from what several senior
managers admitted was a disparity between the risks their firms took and those their boards of
directors perceived the firms to be taking. . . . Within firms, the stature and influence of revenue
producers clearly exceeded those of risk management and control functions.”); Brian W. Nocco
& René M. Stulz, Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.
8, 8 (2006) (“[A]t a large and growing number of companies, the risk management function is
directed by a senior executive with the title of chief risk officer (CRO) and overseen by a board
of directors charged with monitoring risk measurements and setting limits for these measures.”);
René M. Stulz, 6 Ways Companies Mismanage Risk, 87 HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2009, at 86, 92–
93 (“If a firm has state-of-the-art risk-management systems but the board and the CEO don’t
understand them because the (technically very savvy) risk manager cannot properly explain the
complex reports to nonexperts, the systems may do more harm than good by inspiring
unwarranted confidence in their capabilities. Even worse, information may reach top
management too late or be distorted by intermediaries.”). Effective risk managers function
independently of profit centers and have the requisite knowledge and experience to question
properly the underlying methodologies and heuristics of financial products. Therefore, these
individuals may be ideally situated to reevaluate the continued accuracy of heuristic-based
customs. For financial-community members to benefit from this required reevaluation,
however, risk managers must have the ability to notify and request prompt action of top
management with respect to outdated heuristic-based custom. Granting risk managers the
authority to override the decisions of business managers upon a determination that the
underlying heuristic is outdated would prevent timely continued reliance. Monitoring incentives
may also encourage periodic reevaluation if structured to reward past superior risk practices
with actual observed losses. Such an incentive would have likely increased attention to future
long-term losses not properly captured in VaR models, the different credit-rating methodology
(and increased unreliability) for structured financial products, and the risk inherent in relying on
rising collateral prices to achieve overcollateralization.
87. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1370.
88. A possible approach to limiting new complex financial products might be to require an
approval process for such products, similar to that used by the Food and Drug Administration
for approving new medications. Compare Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for
Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st-Century Financial
Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010606 (“We propose that when firms
invent new financial products, they be forbidden to sell them until they receive approval from a
government agency designed along the lines of the FDA, which screens pharmaceutical
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be limited, however, by requiring that financial products become
more standardized, thereby making such products more
89
understandable. It is unclear, though, whether the net effect of
requiring standardization would be socially beneficial. Although
standardization would certainly reduce the need to rely on heuristics,
it would limit the ability of the market to achieve efficiencies by
issuing securities tailored to the particular needs of investors, and it
could also make financial markets less competitive than
90
unstandardized markets. Also, perversely, standardization could
reinforce complacency with heuristic-derived customs, creating a
greater risk of failure if changing circumstances cause those customs
to become outdated. Standardization would moreover be likely to
face opposition by financial-community members because
91
commoditizing financial products would reduce profitability. It
therefore is unclear whether, on a cost-benefit basis, trying to limit
complex financial products makes sense.

innovations. The agency would approve financial products if they satisfy a test for social utility
that focuses on whether the product will likely be used more often for insurance than for
gambling.”), with Saule T. Omarova, License To Deal: Mandatory Approval of New Complex
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 52), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996755 (proposing a similar regulatory scheme for complex financial
products, but one that uses an “economic purpose” test requiring the financial institution “to
make an affirmative showing that the proposed complex financial instrument has a bona fide
economic purpose that promotes productive enterprise and does not merely provide another
means of financial speculation or regulatory arbitrage”). Even if this approach otherwise
reduces the introduction of dangerous new financial products, however, it would not directly
address our Essay’s problem: reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs even for financial
products that are not inherently dangerous.
89. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1390 (discussing, among other things, the
Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that certain derivatives products be effectively standardized).
90. Compare Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 241 (arguing that regulatory attempts to limit
uncertainty by standardizing transactions and financial products would likely have unintended
negative consequences), with Judge, supra note 38, at 715 n.184 (arguing that standardization
could reduce the informational burden on investors, facilitate coordination in the face of
changed circumstances, and make comparing securities issued in different transactions easier for
investors), and NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE
IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 193–94 (2010) (listing potential benefits of increased
standardization of ABS, including facilitating comparison and accurate pricing of these
securities and “creat[ing] more liquid and transparent markets for [them],” but noting that “a
few caveats also come to mind”).
91. See, e.g., Joseph R. Mason, Regulating for Financial System Development, Financial
Institutions Stability, and Financial Innovation, in FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE
WAKE OF FINANCIAL CRISES: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 225 (Alfredo Gigliobianco &
Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009) (arguing that banks may oppose greater standardization because
standardization tends to reduce profit margins).
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3. Criminalizing the Following of Outdated Heuristic-Based
Customs. The third way that law could make it less likely that parties
will follow outdated heuristic-based customs would be to criminalize
the practice. We believe, however, that criminalization would be
inappropriate. Criminal liability, which in the United States is largely
92
imposed by state and federal statutes, generally requires mens rea,
or a “general notion of moral blameworthiness,” on the part of the
93
actor. Many states have adopted a more specific, elemental mens rea
component whereby criminal liability attaches only if an actor has a
94
specific state of mind for the crime. Because one who follows a
heuristic-based custom may not know, or have any way of knowing,
that a particular custom is outdated, it may be difficult to show, much
less prove, mens rea.
Moreover, criminalizing the following of outdated heuristicbased customs would not appear to be justified by any of the
traditional reasons for imposing criminal liability, of which the most
95
relevant would be deterrence and retribution. The deterrent value is
likely to be minimal because, as indicated, it is difficult for one
following a heuristic-based custom to know if that custom is
96
outdated. On the other hand, criminalization might have a chilling
97
effect on the use of appropriate heuristics. In other contexts, it has
been shown that criminal liability can sometimes “over-deter[]

92. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (5th ed. 2009).
93. Id. at 118; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (stating that
criminal liability requires “concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand”).
94. Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory
Interpretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399, 411–12 (2000); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 242
(West 2008) (defining “battery” as “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the
person of another”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012) (defining
“aggravated battery” as “intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] great bodily harm, or permanent
disability or disfigurement”). But see Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Offenses: As
Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, at A1 (“In
recent decades, Congress has repeatedly crafted laws that weaken or disregard the notion of
criminal intent.”). Elemental states of mind can be used not only to impose liability, but also to
impose varying degrees of liability. Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2009)
(requiring “intent to cause the death of another person” for one to be guilty of murder in the
second degree), with id. § 125.15 (requiring the “reckless[] caus[ation of] the death of another
person” for one to be guilty of manslaughter in the second degree).
95. See DRESSLER, supra note 92, at 15–18 (identifying these justifications as deterrence,
retribution, denunciation, and rehabilitation).
96. Indeed, people might not always realize that they are relying on a heuristic-based
custom in the first place.
97. Financial markets could not operate without reliance on heuristics. See supra note 10
and accompanying text.
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otherwise desirable business activities” because parties may avoid
beneficial but “marginally lawful” acts due to the uncertainty of
criminal conviction, thereby increasing social costs and generating
98
inefficiency.
Retribution, or revenge, does not appear to justify imposing
criminal liability on parties following outdated heuristic-based
customs if the parties did not know the customs were outdated and
99
that following them would cause harm. Nonetheless, when
significant harm results, the media often reacts by trying to identify
wrongdoers who should be sent to jail. Retribution has been posited,
for example, as one reason for Enron executives Kenneth Lay and
100
Jeffrey Skilling’s criminal prosecutions. Recent frustration with the
Obama administration for not seeking indictments in the wake of the
global financial crisis and subsequent banking failures suggests
101
continued strong impulses for retribution. Conceptually, though,
significant harm in and of itself should not justify criminalizing actions
102
that lack mens rea.

98. Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling’s Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization Without
Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 459, 461 & n.10 (2010) (quoting Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14).
We later examine whether civil liability could provide appropriate deterrence. See infra Part
III.B.
99. See DRESSLER, supra note 92, at 16 (observing that retributivism justifies punishment
only when a wrongdoer violates a societal custom). Another version of retribution seeks to
signal to the victim that society values his rights more than those of the wrongdoer. Id. at 18.
The fairness of punishment under this theory is that, by choosing to commit the act in question,
the wrongdoer “elevate[d] himself with respect to others.” Id. This justification does not apply
to failures resulting from the custom-to-failure cycle, however, because the actor did not choose
to do wrong and, in fact, he was even unaware that his actions were wrong. To the extent that
advocates of criminal liability seek restitution for victims through the imposition of criminal
fines, this objective can be just as easily accomplished through civil liability, without the social
harms associated with excessive criminalization discussed in this Section.
100. Gopalan, supra note 98, at 459–60.
101. See, e.g., The Diane Rehm Show: Risky Bank Investments and the U.S. Economy
(WAMU 88.5 radio broadcast May 14, 2012), available at http://thedianerehmshow.org/
shows/2012-05-14/risky-bank-investments-and-us-economy (“There is a fundamental problem
here in that nobody has prosecuted anybody from the subprime meltdown, anybody from the
MF Global situation. . . . My view is there should’ve been a ton of indictments brought.”
(quoting Michael Greenberger, a former senior regulator at the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission)).
102. Consider, for example, if one person was unwittingly a carrier—but not himself
infected due to a natural immunity—of a terminal, contagious disease and spread it to several
others. Significant harm results, yet it would be unreasonable to seek revenge on that person for
something of which he was unaware.
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B. Addressing Failures That Result When Parties Follow Outdated
Heuristic-Based Customs
To address failures that result when parties follow outdated
heuristic-based customs, we focus primarily on internalizing
103
externalities. This focus implicates the theory of civil damages, the
goal of which is to “put the plaintiff in the same position . . . as he
would have been had there been no injury or breach”—namely, to
104
compensate the plaintiff for actual injuries. In so doing, civil
damages (1) “restore a sense of fairness” and (2) incentivize actors to
105
internalize externalities.
Externalities could be internalized by imposing civil damages for
106
costs “closely associated with” the act that causes the externalities.
If such damages were imposed for foreseeable harms, the
externalities would be at least partly internalized. If such damages
were imposed for all harms, regardless of foreseeability, most if not
all externalities would be internalized.
Civil damages are normally imposed only for foreseeable
107
harms. However, civil damages can be imposed for all harms,
regardless of foreseeability, under the allocation-of-resources
108
justification of enterprise liability. The rationale for enterprise
liability is that prices should reflect the “actual costs” of goods so as
109
to allow purchasers to make informed decisions. Therefore, “the
cost of injuries should be borne by the activities which caused them,”
regardless of fault, because injuries represent a “real cost” of those
110
activities. Foreseeability is irrelevant under enterprise liability

103. Criminal liability also could be used to address those failures, but we have shown in
Part III.A, supra, why imposing criminal liability would be inappropriate.
104. Steven L. Schwarcz, Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking the Theory of
Damages in a Market Economy, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1053, 1060 (2011) (quoting WALLACE H.
WHIGAM, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMMERCIAL LAW 82 (1913)).
105. Id. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (discussing two justifications for civil liability on the basis of
internalizing externalities—loss spreading and allocation of resources—in the law-andeconomics literature).
106. Calabresi, supra note 105, at 514.
107. Id. at 529.
108. See id. (explaining by example that the allocation-of-resources justification would
impose costs regardless of foreseeability). Another justification for enterprise liability is loss
spreading, such as when the defendant can insure against the damages or pass them on to buyers
of products or services. Id.
109. Id. at 502.
110. Id. at 505.
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because unforeseeable harms are “just as truly costs” of doing
111
business as foreseeable harms.
1. Applying the Theory of Civil Damages to Natural Persons and
Firms. Which justification for liability should apply in the case of
damages caused by reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs? In
a financial context, we believe the answer should depend on whether
the defendant is a natural person or a firm. A natural person, unlike
an enterprise (such as a firm), usually cannot effectively reallocate
resources to prevent harm. A natural person can also be expected to
follow—and, as an individual, likely cannot change—social norms,
including custom-derived norms. Following these norms should be
encouraged because it usually reinforces successful self-regulation of
112
the financial community of which the individual is a member.
Therefore, a natural person who follows custom-derived norms based
on outdated heuristic-based customs should only be liable for
foreseeable damages.
In contrast, financial firms can more effectively reallocate their
resources to prevent harm. For example, we already have discussed
how firms could engage in more self-aware operational risk
113
management and reporting.
Imposing liability for following
outdated custom-derived norms, regardless of foreseeability of harm,
could be a critical motivator for firms to engage in that riskmanagement and reporting effort—effectively pushing firms to try to
114
recognize when they are following an outdated norm. That effort is
needed because following outdated custom-derived norms no longer
115
would result in “successful” self-regulation. Moreover, under the
allocation-of-resources justification of enterprise-liability theory, even
116
unforeseeable harms are a cost of doing business. Therefore, we
believe that a financial firm that follows custom-derived norms based

111. Id. at 529.
112. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
113. See supra Part II.A.
114. This Essay does not examine whether there should be a safe harbor from liability for
firms that take appropriate due-diligence steps in that risk-management and reporting effort.
Any such safe harbor would have to take into account, for example, how those steps could be
defined and whether they would be likely to lead to an acceptable cost-benefit balance.
115. For a discussion of successful self-regulation that results from following custom-derived
norms, see supra notes 15, 112 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text.
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on outdated heuristic-based customs should be liable for all damages,
whether or not foreseeable.
For example, a financial firm that uses VaR models to assess risk,
even after markets have changed to embed credit-default swaps that
117
distort the risk assessments, should be liable for damages to the
extent those models underpredict risk and third parties are injured
because of that under prediction. An underwriter that sells ABS
CDO securities to investors and discloses the risk on the securities
based on those VaR models should thus be liable to the investors for
118
any losses resulting from the under prediction.
We recognize possible counterarguments to such expanded civil
liability. Expanded liability may seem unfair, for example, because at
least some firms may be unable to purchase insurance or charge
119
higher prices to spread unforeseeable losses. Moreover, expanded
liability would penalize conduct that conformed to prevailing societal
norms—in our case, a custom-derived norm—at the time it was
120
performed. Nonetheless, we support expanded civil liability because
not compensating third parties for arguably preventable losses caused
by a financial firm’s profit-making activities would be equally if not
121
more unfair.
117. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
118. The discussion in these paragraphs is a normative analysis and does not take into
account how positive law, such as whether the underwriter might have a due-diligence duty or
defense under applicable securities laws, might impact tort liability. Cf. MARC I. STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 217–18 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing such a duty and possible
defense under the federal securities laws in the United States). Also, we contemplate that if
positive law were to be changed to follow our normative analysis, that change would occur
legislatively. Because of moral conceptions that tend to influence common-law judges, see, e.g.,
Jeremy Waldron, Do Judges Reason Morally?, in EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION 38–39
(Grant Huscroft ed., 2008) (finding that “judges seem to take moral issues seriously”), judges
might be reluctant to extend tort-law liability to internalize externalities of actions not deemed
to be morally wrongful, cf. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
20 (1993) (observing that the law does not require all externalities to be internalized).
119. Calabresi, supra note 105, at 529.
120. We assume that the conduct was neither in bad faith nor, at the time performed, in
violation of a then-existing law. Also, we are not concerned with the easier case of when law
need only address parties who all operate within the given custom. For instance, contracts
between merchants to which the Uniform Commercial Code applies are interpreted to implicitly
adopt a “usage of trade”—a type of custom-derived norm. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2012); Elizabeth
Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42
U. PITT. L. REV. 515, 515 n.3 (1981). In that case, however, only the parties to the contract are
affected by the custom-derived norm, while the custom-to-failure cycle addressed in our Essay
may result in harm to third parties.
121. But cf. TREBILCOCK, supra note 118, at 20 (asking what types of externalities should be
internalized). Imposing liability on banks, which are members of the financial community, for
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2. Ex Post Facto Considerations. The foregoing analysis has not
necessarily taken into account when the law creating the civil liability
arises. That uncertainty calls into question whether civil liability,
especially for unforeseeable harm, should be able to be imposed ex
post facto—that is, by law that arises, whether by statute or common
law, after a party follows an outdated heuristic-based custom.
Imposing ex post facto civil liability on firms that follow outdated
heuristic-derived customs should not, on balance, be unfair because,
122
under the allocation-of-resources theory of enterprise liability,
harms caused by reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs are as
much costs of doing business as more foreseeable injuries. Imposing
ex post facto civil liability on natural persons who follow outdated
heuristic-derived customs likewise should not be unfair. If, as this
Essay argues, natural persons would only be liable for foreseeable
harm, they should have been aware of the consequences of following
those customs. That point assumes, of course, that foreseeability is
not—as it should not be—assessed using hindsight bias.
From a constitutional standpoint, imposing ex post facto civil
liability should also be acceptable. Unlike criminal liability, ex post
123
facto civil liability is not unconstitutional. Furthermore, courts
routinely impose ex post facto civil liability. For example, in applying
tort law’s “reasonably prudent person” standard of care in negligence
124
actions, a jury “determines what the expected level of conduct in
following outdated custom-derived norms also might be inconsistent, to some extent, with cases
holding that banks owe no duty to third parties with whom they are not in privity. See, e.g., City
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 764 A.2d 411, 417 (N.J. 2001) (“Absent a
special relationship, courts will typically bar claims of non-customers against banks.”). But cf.
Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1369–71 (Ala. 1996) (holding that banks have a
duty for foreseeable harms to third parties and stating, in dicta, that “the nature of the activity
of a bank . . . is such that some duty to the public in the exercise of the bank’s business may be
justifiably imposed”). However, any such inconsistency could easily be resolved by imposing a
statutory duty.
.
122 For the observation that not compensating third parties for arguably preventable losses
caused by a financial firm’s profit-making activities would be equally if not more unfair, see
supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
123. Although the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not expressly limited to
laws imposing criminal liability, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, the Supreme Court has held
that it applies only to criminal laws, Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912); see
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 497 (4th ed.
2011) (citing cases in which the Ex Post Facto Clause did not invalidate civil legislation).
124. JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
TORTS 47 (4th ed. 2010). As a positive matter, the reasonably prudent person standard would
presumably be applied to members of the financial community in cases of negligence with
respect to third parties. The professional standard of care applies in cases involving contracts for
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125

the community should be.” Because jury instructions provide little
guidance on the proper determination of this standard of care, jurors
“must draw on their own understanding of reasonable behavior,
126
based on their experience of the world.” In that endeavor, they may
call upon their “personal knowledge” of and “community
acceptance” of any existing practice and need not confine themselves
127
to the actual actions of community members. Because the jury is
effectively defining the community norm at the trial stage and not
128
necessarily at the time of the alleged tort, civil liability is sometimes

services with a client (that is, in cases of privity). See, e.g., Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells,
438 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1971) (“In the practice of his profession, a public accountant may be
held liable for damages to his client resulting from either fraud or negligence.”). Note, however,
that at least one court has held that liability may extend in professional malpractice cases to
third-party victims for reasonably foreseeable intentional misrepresentation. Rusch Factors, Inc.
v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968).
125. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 49; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY &
DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 170 (11th ed. 2005). In
professional tort-negligence cases—those involving “specialized skill and training”—the
standard of care is that of the ordinary, competent member of that profession under similar
circumstances. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 93. Note that the standard is “ordinary,”
rather than “average,” since “average” would, by definition, mean that half the professionals
could not meet the standard. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra, at 170. Because this standard of care
expressly references the practices of the community, then-existing community custom is clearly
implicated: “The defendant’s deviation from custom establishes breach of duty, while the
defendant’s compliance with the custom of the profession insulates the defendant from
negligence liability.” DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 94. For example, the standard of care
for accountants and auditors is “to exercise that degree of care, skill, and competence exercised
by reasonably competent members of the profession,” considering “generally accepted
accounting principles” and “generally accepted auditing standards.” WARREN FREEDMAN,
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY IN THE BUSINESS PROFESSIONS: A SURVEY GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS
AND CLIENTS 19 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law,
91 GEO. L.J. 633, 654 (2003). For pattern jury instructions, see, for example, JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 401 (2012); NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CIVIL 2:16 (3d ed. 2011); and 2 PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 13.20 (4th ed. 2010).
127. Hetcher, supra note 126, at 654. Jurors may consider existing customs of the
community, but such customs are “not conclusive” and therefore not binding upon the jury. 3
FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON
TORTS § 17.3, at 653–54 (3d ed. 2007). For communities dealing in complex products requiring
specialized knowledge—such as the financial community—jurors may also lack the requisite
knowledge to consider and assess the customs of those communities. Application of a
professional standard of care in which reasonableness is judged according to the actions of an
ordinary community member would avoid such difficulties. John E. Montgomery, Cognitive
Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Proposal To Limit Their Effects Without Changing
the World, 85 NEB. L. REV. 15, 41 (2006).
128. See Hetcher, supra note 126, at 634 (“The jury has a great deal of normative discretion
in deciding what is reasonably prudent conduct.” (quoting Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in
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imposed based on ex post norms. Indeed, courts and commentators
have explicitly acknowledged that evidence of compliance with norms
in existence at the time of the alleged tort does not “conclusively
130
establish” lack of breach of duty.
CONCLUSION
In areas of complexity, our limited ability to process information
often requires us to simplify reality in order to make decisions.
Modern finance, for example, has become so complex that the
financial community routinely relies on these types of simplifications,
or heuristics. Thus, the financial community routinely determines the
creditworthiness of securities by relying on formalistic credit ratings
and assesses the risk associated with financial products by relying on
simplified mathematical models. Without this reliance, financial
markets could not operate.

Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424–25
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
129. Judge Learned Hand noted just this possibility, writing: “It is true that we think of [the
duty to act as a reasonably prudent person] as though it were imposed before the event, because
it demands only ‘reasonable’ care; but that does not specify the conduct required and creates a
duty incapable of being known in advance, and it is ascertained and imposed only retroactively.”
Stornelli v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 F.2d 461, 462–63 (1943) (dicta). Judge Hand, therefore,
subscribed to a formulaic consideration of costs and benefits. United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947) (describing his B < PL analysis). The Restatement (Third) of Torts
(2010) endorses adoption of a balancing of factors akin to a “risk-benefit test” similar to Judge
Hand’s approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. e (2010). However, despite the Restatement’s position, many jury
instructions do not currently instruct the jury to engage in this balancing to determine whether
there was a breach. See, e.g., supra note 127 and sources cited therein.
130. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 69. It seems incongruous, however, that deviation
from an industry standard sufficiently establishes a breach of duty, while conformity with a
standard cannot sufficiently establish a lack of such breach of duty; the industry standard either
reflects best practices of the industry or it does not. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13; DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 124, at 68.
Product-liability law adopts a similar position with respect to industry standards. David
G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003,
1019–20 (2004); Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43
U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1455 (2009). But see Vetri, supra, at 1454 (noting that some cases suggest
that deviation from industry standards is “persuasive proof of design defect” because such
standards “carry[] the approval of a significant segment of an industry” (citation omitted)
(quoting Frazier v. Cont’l Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 1978)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The disproportionate impact afforded deviation from an industry standard relative to
conformity with an industry standard seems incongruous: the industry standard either reflects
best practices of the industry or it does not.
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When reliance on heuristics becomes routine and widespread
within a community, it can develop into a custom. Society benefits as
long as such a “heuristic-based custom” reasonably approximates
reality. In the financial sector, however, rapid changes in markets and
products have disconnected some of these customs from reality,
leading to massive failures. Increasing financial complexity is also
accelerating the rate of change, threatening future failures. This Essay
examines this “custom-to-failure cycle,” analyzing how law can help
to manage the cycle and mitigate its failures. The Essay argues that
law should require financial firms to engage in more self-aware risk
management and reporting in order to reevaluate their heuristicbased customs periodically. The Essay also engages the fundamental
but more difficult question of whether law should impose liability for
unforeseeable harm caused by conduct that conformed to prevailing
societal norms—in our case, a custom-derived norm for which the
underlying heuristic has become outdated—at the time performed. It
explains why civil liability should be appropriate to help deter
reliance on outdated heuristic-based customs and to internalize the
harm that can occur when parties follow those outdated customs. It
also shows why financial firms should be liable for all associated
harm, whereas natural persons should be liable only for foreseeable
harm.

